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ARTICLES
NURSING FACILITY ENFORCEMENT BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE
APPEALS BOARD - THE BREAKDOWN OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT STANDARDS, AND
MODEST PROPOSALS TO ACCOMMODATE AGENCY
PREROGATIVES WITH FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
Joseph L. Bianculli †
ABSTRACT
Skilled nursing facilities (commonly called nursing homes) are said to be
the second-most regulated businesses in America, second only to nuclear
power plants. Such facilities are subject to comprehensive federal regulation
at 42 C.F.R. Part 483 (the “Long Term Care Requirements of Participation”)
that govern virtually every aspect of facility design, staffing, programming,
service delivery, resident rights, and even resident outcomes. That degree of
regulation reflects public demand that the government has a responsibility to
protect frail, elderly residents, and also the demands of federal and state
governments as customers, since they pay for the care of more than threequarters of nursing facility residents through the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has regulatory authority
to enforce the Long Term Care Requirements of Participation, including the
authority to impose a variety of “remedial” sanctions tailored to the “severity”
and “scope” of noncompliance. The Social Security Act, and CMS’
regulations, in turn, provide for an administrative appeal process before the
DHHS “Departmental Appeals Board” (the Board) by which nursing
facilities can challenge sanctions with which they disagree. In that process, an
administrative law judge conducts a trial-type adjudication, and then a panel
of the Board itself reviews the ALJ’s Decision.
In a perfect world, CMS would win every nursing facility enforcement
appeal because inspectors would cite violations of clear standards;
supervisors would weed out weak cases; the agency would offer sufficient
evidence and argument to meet any applicable standard of review; and ALJs
† Partner, Health Care Lawyers, PLC, Arlington, VA. A.B. magna cum laude
Georgetown University 1975, J.D. cum laude Georgetown University Law Center 1978.
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would issue well-reasoned and supported decisions. But over the years, as the
number and complexity of the regulations and accompanying agency
directives—and appeals—has ballooned, the enforcement and appeal process
has become sloppier. Some agency guidance is ambiguous or allows
inspectors great room for “judgment.” Overworked inspectors make factual
mistakes or can be unfamiliar with current standards of clinical practice.
Regulators can have unrealistic expectations. Imposition of sanctions can be
unpredictable, subjective and even arbitrary in specific cases. And ALJs can
be result-oriented.
This paper addresses a more glaring legal flaw in the administrative appeal
process. Every court that has addressed the question has held that the Board’s
administrative review process is governed by the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). But in recent
years, the Board has held in a series of cases that it is not subject to even the
most basic of those standards. For instance, the Board says that it can review
sanctions de novo, and may substitute otherwise-prohibited “post hoc
rationalizations” to “fix” flawed agency actions. It says that it may “presume”
that CMS’ allegations of noncompliance are true, that the agency has no
burden to support them, and that a petitioner challenging agency action has
the burden to “persuade” it otherwise—all directly contrary to APA
standards. Not coincidentally, during the past decade, the Board has reversed
every ALJ Decision in favor of a nursing facility that CMS has asked it to
review.
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with an agency’s
legitimate enforcement prerogatives, particularly where, as here, a specific
enforcement action involves application of specialized regulations in an area
within the agency’s expertise. But nursing facilities dissatisfied with the
Board’s cutting of procedural corners are appealing more and more cases
raising APA issues to the courts, and the courts now are addressing such
issues. The premise of this paper is that it is in the best interests of all—CMS,
the Board, regulated entities, and the residents whose interests ultimately are
at issue—that the Board reform its processes, and conform with the APA,
before the courts do so on an ad hoc basis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Skilled nursing facilities (commonly called nursing homes) are said to be
the second-most regulated businesses in America, second only to nuclear
power plants.1 Such facilities are subject to comprehensive overlapping
1. The media, and much of the public, sometimes do not distinguish among “nursing
facilities,” which are highly regulated facilities that provide “hands on” nursing and
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federal, state, and local regulation of virtually every aspect of facility design,
staffing, programming, service delivery, resident rights, and even resident
outcomes.2 That degree of regulation reflects not only the universal public
demand that the government has a responsibility to protect frail, elderly
residents from abuse and exploitation,3 but also the demands of federal and
state governments as customers, since they pay for the care of more than
three-quarters of nursing facility residents through the Medicare and
Medicaid Programs.4

rehabilitation therapy services, as opposed to assisted living facilities, rest homes, retirement
communities, personal care homes, and other congregate facilities that also serve elderly or
disabled persons. The latter generally provide less intensive medical services (if any), are much
less regulated by the states, and are not regulated at all by the federal government. According
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), there are about 15,600
nursing facilities nationwide serving about 1.35 million residents at any given time and about
twice as many assisted living and similar facilities serving an unknown number of residents.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., VITAL HEALTH AND
STAT. SER. 3, NO. 38, LONG-TERM CARE PROVIDERS AND SERVICE USERS IN THE UNITED STATES:
DATA FROM THE NATIONAL STUDY OF LONG-TERM CARE PROVIDERS, 2013-2014 (2016)
[hereinafter NCHS REPORT]. The discussion in this paper is limited to federal regulation of
nursing facilities.
2. Persons who live in nursing facilities are called “residents” for regulatory purposes.
The NCHS Report indicates that two-thirds of nursing facility residents are women, about half
are over age 85, and about 15% are under age 65. See NCHS REPORT, supra note 2.
3. “Nursing home abuse and neglect” is a perennial topic of media reports, political
attention, and plaintiffs’ lawyer advertising. For instance, one plaintiffs’ law firm’s website
warns that 10 million nursing facility residents are abused each year (eight times the total
HOME
ABUSE
CTR.,
number
of
residents).
See
NURSING
http://www.nursinghomeabusecenter.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). The actual number of
even alleged abuse and neglect cases—by any definition, with even one, of course, being too
many—is far lower, and less than 10% of such allegations ever are substantiated. One problem
is definitional; for instance, various state laws, professional associations and authors define
“sexual abuse” to include everything from inappropriate jokes or greeting cards, to vulgar
remarks and threats, to unwanted nudity or forced photography, to physical contact including
kissing and fondling, to actual criminal rape. In fact, the most common allegation of sexual
abuse in nursing facilities involves resident-to-resident kissing and fondling. See generally
Robert A. Hawks, Grandparent Molesting: Sexual Abuse of Elderly Nursing Home Residents
and Its Prevention, 8 MARQ. ELDER ADVISOR 159, 172 (2006); NCCD, The Study of Sexual Abuse
of Vulnerable Adults in Care Facilities, VIMEO (Apr. 20, 2011), https://vimeo.com/36486508
(Nat’l Council on Crime & Delinquency webinar by Dr. Holly Ramsey-Klawsnik & Dr. Pamela
Teaster from the Nat’l Comm. for Prevention of Elder Abuse).
4. Medicare, the federal health insurance program for persons age 65 and over and some
disabled persons, covers limited post-hospitalization long term care services, usually for
rehabilitation following a hospitalization. Medicaid, the cooperative state-federal medical
assistance program for persons who meet certain income and asset limits, pays for nursing
facility care for qualifying beneficiaries who meet threshold medical criteria. According to
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No one disputes that regulation of health and safety for elderly persons in
nursing facilities is a vital governmental function. Nursing care is provided
by people who make mistakes, have bad days, and can be overwhelmed by
emergencies; and even one bad apple abusing or neglecting a vulnerable
resident is one too many. But over the years, as the number and complexity
of federal and state regulations and accompanying directives has ballooned,
some regulations have become obsolete and do not directly address the
circumstances of modern nursing facilities or current standards of resident
care. Some regulations are ambiguous or allow inspectors, known as
surveyors, great room for administrative “judgment.” Surveyors can make
mistakes or be unfamiliar with current standards of practice. Moreover,
regulators can have unrealistic expectations (or political axes to grind). And
imposition of sanctions for violations can be unpredictable, subjective, and
even arbitrary in specific cases.
Whether the current regulatory system—or any regulatory system—can
address and resolve all human performance issues, even in a critical area such
as health care, is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this paper focuses
on one aspect of this regulatory regimen, the appeals process by which
nursing facilities can contest what they believe to be unwarranted or excessive
“enforcement” sanctions imposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) for violations of the federal “Long Term Care Requirements
of Participation.”5 In some ways, this one small area of administrative
litigation vividly illustrates how an increasingly authoritarian, yet resourcestrapped bureaucracy, cuts legal corners and minimizes oversight of its
DHHS, 96.9% of nursing facilities participate in the Medicare Program, and 95.1% participate
in the Medicaid Program (the balance serves only private pay or charity residents). See NCHS
REPORT, supra note 2. Nationwide, Medicaid pays for the care of about two-thirds of nursing
facility residents, and Medicare another 10% or so (the balance pays privately, with insurance,
or charity care), although those percentages vary from state to state and facility to facility,
depending on the specific services the facility provides.
5. Various “chapters” or “parts” of the Medicare regulations set forth “conditions of
participation” that various categories of health care providers—hospitals, home health
agencies, hospices, and the like—must meet to “participate in” the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs. For nursing facilities, these requirements are called the Long Term Care
Requirements of Participation and are found at 42 C.F.R. pt.t 483. See 42 C.F.R. § 483 (2016).
As discussed in the text, CMS amplifies and explains these regulatory requirements in
thousands of pages of “Interpretive Guidelines,” notices, directives, memoranda, and the like.
While the latter are not legally binding on nursing facilities because they are not promulgated
pursuant to the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, CMS
does consider such informal directives to be authoritative interpretations of the regulations
and does direct inspectors to evaluate compliance by them. See e.g., CTR. MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., State Operations Manual, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som107ap_pp_guidelines_ltcf.pdf.
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actions. The premise of this paper is that this insulation of agency action from
effective oversight is caused less by any particular administration’s politics or
policies than by the difficulty—some would say impossibility—of effective
outside review of agency decision-making at the complex intersection of law
and science. For instance, the agency can paint its specific enforcement
activities in very broad strokes, such as protection of resident health and
safety.
As discussed below, a series of recent judicial decisions illustrates the
practical and legal difficulties that courts face when designing remedies
where CMS, overwhelmed by inadequate resources, uses legal and
evidentiary shortcuts to dispose of (or simply not to decide) administrative
appeals. Not incidentally, CMS thereby prevents, limits, or delays judicial
review of its actions (which itself has due process implications). This Article
suggests that the agency has the tools to address and fix its problems—before
the courts step in, as they increasingly are doing—and, specifically, that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)6 provides the necessary structure for
appropriate administrative decision-making.
II. BACKGROUND
A detailed review of the history and content of nursing facility regulation
is beyond the scope of this Article, but some history is useful to put the
shortcomings of today’s regulatory and appeals processes into perspective.7
Prior to the 1970s, most “old age homes” and the like were operated by
religious or voluntary organizations or local governments, for instance, “poor
houses.” Congress enacted the Medicare Program in 1965 to provide basic
health insurance to elderly persons. At that time, elderly persons were the
poorest age cohort in America, largely because any health issue could be
economically devastating.8 But Medicare provided, and provides, only
limited coverage for post-acute care, generally limited to 100 days per year
for post-hospital care in a nursing facility, usually for rehabilitation from
surgery or an acute event such as a stroke. In 1966, Congress enacted the
Medicaid Program as an adjunct to Medicare to pay for certain services that

6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (1946).
7. As discussed in the text, Congress largely based the current regulatory process on a
landmark 1986 report by the Institute of Medicine. See INST. MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY
OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES app. 1 (1986) [hereinafter IOM REPORT] (summarizing the history
of long-term care).
8. See CMS’ Program History, CTR. FOR MED. HISTORY, cms.gov/About-CMS/Agencyinformation/History (summarizing the history of Medicare) (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
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Medicare did not cover for poor people.9 It was not long before entrepreneurs
realized that many elderly persons who required long term nursing care
qualified for Medicaid, and so through the 1970s and 1980s the number of
nursing facilities—about two-thirds of which now are operated as for-profit
businesses—grew rapidly, to the point that Medicaid reimbursement for
nursing facility services is now one of the largest line items on most states’
budgets.10
At the same time, real and perceived abuses of the Program grew:
incompetent operators; untrained or insufficient staff; financial exploitation
and other “resident rights” issues; and a variety of clinical concerns, including
lack of a uniform resident assessment instrument, inconsistent care planning,
and inadequate registered nurse coverage and physician oversight. Resident
advocacy groups such as the National Citizens Committee for Nursing Home
Reform began to publicize such concerns and tied them in large part to the
lack of effective federal regulatory requirements.11 These concerns focused on
substantive requirements as well as the lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms. For instance, early Medicare regulations required only that a
facility have certain policies and procedures in place but did not address how
well the facility actually implemented such policies.12 Elder rights advocates

9. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Program History, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-history (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
10. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MEDPAC) reports that Medicaid
accounted for 28.7% of all state spending in FY 2016. In comparison, MEDPAC reports that
state spending on elementary and secondary education totaled 19.6% of state budgets (local
government school spending is much more in most states), and state spending for higher
education totaled 10.5% of state spending. See medpac.gov/subtopic/medicaid-share-ofstates-budgets. In recent years, between 30% and 40% of Medicaid spending has been devoted
to long term care (the amount of long-term care spending continues to increase, but the
percentage of total Medicaid spending devoted to long term care is declining, as most
“Medicaid expansion” under the Affordable Care Act is for non-long-term care services). See
Eiken et al., Long-Term Services and Supports: 2015 Total Medicaid Spending, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
11. See History, THE NAT’L CONSUMER VOICE FOR QUALITY LONG-TERM CARE,
https://www.theconsumervoice.org/about/history (summarizing consumer efforts to
persuade Congress to address nursing home reform in the 1970s) (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
12. At the same time, the legislative history to the current nursing facility enforcement
statute, which is described in the text below, recites that Congress did not intend the inspection
and enforcement process “to determine whether every nursing facility is in compliance with
every requirement of participation. Instead, its purpose is to detect facilities where residents
are not receiving quality care.” H.R. Rep. No. 391, at 468 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1. As this paper illustrates, during the last 30 years, as widespread
structural quality-related issues (inconsistent staffing requirements, lack of uniform resident
assessment and care planning, lax physician oversight, overuse or misuse of psychotropic
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focused on so-called “yo-yo” compliance, where surveyors repeatedly cited
noncompliance at a facility—which suggested inability or unwillingness to
comply—but the facility suffered no adverse consequences. At that time, the
law basically limited sanctions for noncompliance to decertification or
“termination” of an offending facility from the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs—which CMS was reluctant to do because of the disruption and
“transfer trauma” associated with involuntary resident relocation, and loss of
jobs.13 Indeed, the few courts that addressed potential decertifications at this
time generally were reluctant to relocate residents involuntarily unless
conditions throughout a facility were dire.14

medications, and the like) have largely been eliminated from nursing facilities, the focus of the
survey and enforcement process has drifted away from such systemic issues toward citation of
allegedly inadequate individual resident outcomes (sometimes without sophisticated analysis
of causation or inevitability) and specific instances of staff errors and omissions, poor
judgments, or even second-guessing of professional judgments in specific cases.
13. See, e.g., IOM Report, supra note 8, at ch. 5.
14. See Lexington Mgmt. Co. v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 656 F. Supp. 36, 41 (W.D. Mo.
1986), where the court enjoined termination of Medicaid payments to a nursing facility
pending the appeal of a Medicaid termination, on the ground that termination of payment
would have required relocation of the residents. In characterizing the prevention of transfer
trauma as a matter of public interest, the court explained:
[N]ursing home residents are susceptible to a phenomenon known as "transfer
trauma." This phenomenon -- which is oftentimes characterized by a refusal to
eat, a general sense of disorientation, or a loss of one's will to live -- commonly
affects nursing home residents who are suddenly forced to vacate familiar
surroundings. Transfer trauma has even been directly linked to the deaths of
some nursing home residents.
Likewise, in Wayside Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 663 F. Supp. 945, 954
(N.D. Ohio 1987), the court noted that “transfer of some of the patients may be difficult for
many and impossible for some.” The court granted an injunction because “[p]reserving the
status quo under these circumstances until the decision has been thoroughly considered avoids
the transfer of patients. . . .” Id. See also Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir.
1976) (temporarily enjoining termination of Medicaid payments to nursing facility where
involuntary relocation of residents “would create a major disruption in their lives.”);
Greenwald v. Whalen, No. 78-Civ.2765-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1979), reprinted in COMMERCE
CLEARING HOUSE, CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE ¶ 29,512 (1977) (enjoining reduction
of Medicaid payments to nursing facility because “the involuntary transfer of aged, seriously
ill patients is dangerous to them”); Burchette v. Dumpson, 387 F. Supp. 812, 819 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (explaining that risk of transfer trauma constitutes irreparable injury because “[c]hanges
in surroundings and movement of long distances of senior citizens who are suffering from
physical and psychological infirmities are likely to aggravate their condition and increase the
likelihood of death”); MacLeod v. Miller, CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide ¶ 30,560 (Colo.
Ct. App. May 22, 1980) (overruling trial court refusal to enjoin transfer of nursing home
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In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration proposed “outcome oriented”
regulations designed to address the actual impact of facility noncompliance
on resident health and safety.15 However, the regulations were not finalized
before the Carter Administration left office, and the Reagan Administration
withdrew the proposal as part of its “deregulation” efforts.16
In response, Congress commissioned a study of nursing facility quality by
the Institute of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health. The Institute of
Medicine published an exhaustive report in 1986 (the IOM Report) that
identified dozens of structural and operational issues regarding staffing,
quality of care, quality of life, resident rights, and regulatory compliance.17
The IOM Report also made numerous policy recommendations, which
Congress translated almost verbatim into legislative language included in the
“nursing home reform” provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 (OBRA ’87).18
These OBRA ‘87 provisions, which are scattered throughout the Medicare
and Medicaid Titles of the Social Security Act, remain the substantive basis
for nursing facility regulation today (even though residents, facilities and
clinical standards of care have changed considerably in the interim). The
statutory provisions include very detailed operational and clinical provisions,
as well as detailed provisions for residents’ rights, that provide the basis for
what became known as the regulatory “Long Term Care Requirements of
Participation,” which were promulgated in 1995 and have been revised from
time to time in the interim, most recently in 2015.19
resident because the “psychological and physical side effects” of transfer trauma “would be
immediate and irreparable”).
15. New Directions for Skilled Nursing and Intermediate Care Facilities, 43 Fed. Reg.
24873 (proposed June 8, 1978) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405 and 449).
16. See Weiner, et al., “Nursing Home Care Quality,” Henry J. Kaiser Foundation,
December 2007, at 4.
17. COMM’N ON NURSING HOME REG., NAT’L INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
CARE IN NURSING HOMES (1986).
18. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (Dec. 22, 1987). For several years during the 1980s,
Congress accumulated all “must pass” legislation into a session-ending omnibus bill so that
President Reagan could not veto individual measures. The nursing home reform provisions of
OBRA ‘87 are included in Title IV of the Bill, including substantive requirements at §§ 4201
et seq.; survey and certification procedures at §§ 4202 et seq.; and enforcement provisions at
§§ 4213 et seq. Most, but not all, of those provisions are codified in Title 42 of the U.S. Code,
with most Medicare provisions located at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 et seq., and most more or less
parallel Medicaid provisions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r et seq. There are additional provisions
throughout the statute.
19. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care
Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168 et seq. (proposed July 16, 2015) (to be published at 42 C.F.R. pts.
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OBRA ‘87 also includes “enforcement” provisions that set forth a rigorous
inspection (or “survey”) process and authorize the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to impose a range of “remedies” or sanctions for
noncompliance in addition to termination, including CMPs, directed plans
of correction, denials of payment for new Medicare/Medicaid admissions,
and others.20 The notion was that a range of sanctions could be tailored to the
“severity” and “scope” of noncompliance, replacing the previous provisions
that provided only for termination from the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs, in order to promote effective corrective of deficiencies rather than
only punishment.21
The Secretary has delegated enforcement activities, including imposition
of sanctions, to CMS. CMS, in turn, enters into contracts with “State Survey
Agencies” to perform the actual inspections or “surveys,” subject to CMS
oversight.22 Additionally, CMS has delegated day-to-day enforcement
activities to its ten Regional Offices. This enforcement system triggers the
appeals processes addressed in this Article.
This background provides the context for the administrative law issues
addressed in this Article. Where Congress delegates enforcement authority
to an administrative agency—that is, when Congress creates, and then
delegates, the authority to impose fines or other penalties—that agency is
then bound by the due process requirements of the Constitution. The courts
generally are unwilling to frustrate an agency’s legitimate enforcement
prerogatives by imposing burdensome procedural requirements, so the
courts have established minimal constitutional due process requirements for
agency enforcement activities. These requirements typically include only
notice of the grounds for the agency’s action; some formal opportunity to
contest the action before a neutral decisionmaker; some statement of grounds
for the agency’s final action; and generally—although not always—some

405, 431, 447, 482, 483, 485, and 488) (Final rule published at 81 Fed. Reg. 68688 et seq. (Oct.
4, 2016)).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g) (2014),1395i-3(h) (2014), 1396r(g) (2011), 1396r(h) (2011).
21. However, as noted in note 12 above, it is unclear whether the Congress ever intended
the enforcement process to focus on specific acts and omissions, or specific resident outcomes,
as it currently does, as opposed to overall quality of care. Indeed, one of the authors of the
IOM Report suggested to the author that using policy aspirations such as those set forth in the
Report as the basis for sanctioning bad outcomes was “pushing a string,” that is, that a focus
only on punishing bad outcomes is, at best, an inefficient way to describe and incentivize
desired outcomes. But as the discussion in the text illustrates, it is difficult to translate policy
aspirations into a regulatory enforcement system, much less into an appeal process. IOM
REPORT, supra note 8.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (2008).
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provision for judicial review.23 At the same time, overburdened federal courts
are reluctant to open their doors to categories of agency enforcement cases
for which agency adjudicators and administrative law judges (“ALJs”) may
serve, at least in the first instance, as effective substitutes for Article III
judges.24 The Supreme Court has indicated that courts generally should
accord considerable deference to an agency’s interpretation and application
of its own regulations, especially where specific interpretation and
application of a regulation is said to be within the scope of the agency’s
expertise.25 Of course, application of these general rules can be problematic
where, for instance, the agency is good at designing and describing inspection
procedures, but has little specific knowledge or expertise about the
circumstances of a specific patient’s case, or the considerations that affected
a physician’s or a nurse’s professional decisions in a case that an inspector is
reviewing.
The questions where to draw the line between effective implementation of
delegated statutory enforcement authority and “arbitrary and capricious”
agency action; and how to facilitate effective oversight of an agencies’ day-today decision making without unduly burdening the agency, are not new.
Seventy years ago, Congress enacted the APA26 largely to address concerns
by Congress, regulated entities, and civil libertarians about administrative
23. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
24. Congress created in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1935), what the courts
call a “channeling” requirement that generally requires exhaustion of the administrative
appeal process before a court may review any CMS enforcement action. The history of
application of this provision is extremely complicated; suffice it to say that for decades courts,
including the Supreme Court, carved out various exceptions, including for certain nursing
facility appeals. See, e.g., Mediplex of Mass.v. Shalala, 39 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D. Mass. 1999). In
2000, the Supreme Court closed all such loopholes and held that any claim arising under the
Medicare statute must at least be “presented to” the agency’s administrative review process
before resort to federal court. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
Since that time, federal courts almost uniformly have held that they do not have jurisdiction
to address the merits of CMS enforcement actions before the administrative process is
complete. See, e.g., Cathedral Rock of N. Coll. Hill, Inc. v. Shalala, 223 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2000).
As discussed in the text, the “channeling” rule, combined with lengthy delays in the
administrative process, makes it difficult to get relief from termination actions and large civil
money penalties.
25. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In
general, under Chevron, an agency may “interpret” its regulations only where the plain
language of the regulation is ambiguous, the interpretation is within the scope of the agency’s
expertise, and the authority delegated by Congress. Over the years, some courts have expanded
this notion of “deference” to application of agency regulations—whether ambiguous or not—
in specific cases, a result that is controversial today.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2000).
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agency accountability as the number, size, and authority of agencies grew
during the New Deal and World War II. All shared the concern that there
was no practical way for Congress to provide detailed oversight of the dayto-day activities of the myriad agencies Congress had created to implement
various regulatory, economic, and social welfare programs. Thus, as the
Supreme Court has put it, Congress enacted the APA as “as an antidote to”
this lack of accountability.27 According to one commentator, “administrative
law [developed as] the law controlling administrative agencies, not the law
produced by them.”28 Likewise, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted, in a celebrated
law review article that foreshadowed and largely prompted enactment of the
APA, “how to fit ancient liberties [to administrative agencies] . . . is the special
task of administrative law.”29
The APA thus addresses two main topics: rulemaking and adjudication.
First, “rulemaking,” the process for enacting (or repealing) regulations under
which the agency establishes and imposes requirements or prohibitions.30
Such procedures include public notice of proposed regulations (or repeals),
a clear statement of purpose and statutory basis for same, and an opportunity
for public comment. The courts regularly enforce such procedural hurdles as
checks on impatient or unrestrained agency or executive branch action31 and,
as we see in contemporary news reports, the APA can thwart executive
branch efforts to repeal regulations without employing such procedures.32
And second, “adjudication,” the process by which an agency enforces its
rules or orders in specific cases; or, as in the case of nursing facility
enforcement actions, the process by which the regulated party can challenge
such actions.33 This Article addresses the second part of this second topic,
that is, the process by which a nursing facility can challenge a CMS finding
of noncompliance with the Long Term Care Requirements of Participation,

27. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Corp., 415 U.S. 1, 34 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting
on other grounds); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
28. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §1.1, 4 (1984) (emphasis added).
29. Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 586 (1941).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
31. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
32. See, e.g., Lorelei Laird, Political Lawsuits Bring the Administrative Procedure Act to the
J.
(Mar.
5,
2018),
Forefront,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/political_lawsuits_bring_the_administrative_proce
dure_act_to_the_forefront; Reinventing Governance, Trump Faces Major Hurdle for
Rescinding Rule Under the Administrative Procedure Act, REINVENTING GOVERNANCE (Feb. 01,
2018),
https://fednews.iwpnews.com/trump-faces-major-hurdles-rescinding-rules-underadministrative-procedure-act.
33. 5 U.S.C §§ 554 (1978), 556 (1990), 557 (1976), 558 (1966).
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and the resulting sanction; how far that process has drifted from the
requirements of the APA, and what can be done to get the process back on
track.
This paper applies general administrative law principles in this narrow
context. For instance, where does the APA draw the line between facilitation
of effective agency action and a regulated party’s right to due process? Does
the APA allow an agency to develop or implement a review system that allows
a non-ALJ to overrule an ALJ’s findings of fact or conclusions of law that the
ALJ made following an “on the record” proceeding? If so, has the APA failed?
And if courts defer to that sort of agency administrative review, has the
agency become an unaccountable (and extra-constitutional) fourth branch
of government?
Again, the context of these issues is critical. In a perfect world, an agency
enforcing health and safety requirements would prevail on the merits in every
enforcement case because the regulated party would be on notice of exactly
what behavior the regulation requires or prohibits; the agency inspector
would carefully document how the party violated that requirement or
prohibition; supervisors, or agency counsel, would weed out (or send
inspectors back to fix) questionable or weak cases; and the evidence and
rationale supporting a violation would be expressed clearly in a charging
document, agency pleadings, and the ALJ’s Decision.
Unfortunately, those ideal steps do not always happen in CMS nursing
facility cases. Surveyors sometimes make up and employ ad hoc standards
not set forth in regulations or CMS guidance; emotional reactions to negative
resident outcomes sometimes overcome reasoned analysis and application of
regulations; poorly trained or inexperienced surveyors sometimes render
judgments beyond the scope of their expertise; supervisors sometimes are
reluctant to counter the decisions of low level officials (sometimes from fear
of appearing “soft” on violators); ALJs sometimes rubber-stamp agency
decisions on the basis of “presumptions” of noncompliance; and the agency
frequently limits the scope of administrative review.
This Article examines these issues through the lens of the Department of
Health and Human Services’ (“DHHS”) “Departmental Appeals Board”
(“DAB” or “Board”), the administrative board that nursing facilities
dissatisfied with adverse findings and sanctions must appeal to before
heading to court. The premise of the article is that legislative and internal
oversight of this sort of nuts-and-bolts agency enforcement decision making
largely has failed. Thus, if there is to be any accountability in the system at
all, the agency itself must impose internal discipline, largely structured by the
APA, lest courts eventually impose such discipline from outside, on an ad
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hoc basis, sometimes in cases that present extreme fact patterns, and without
necessarily considering all of the agency’s legitimate prerogatives.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT AND APPEALS PROCESS
As noted, there are about 15,600 nursing facilities in the country
(providing care to about 1.35 million residents), nearly all of which
“participate” in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs. In order to obtain and
maintain such “certification,” a facility must comply with the “Long Term
Care Requirements of Participation” set forth in 42 C.F.R. Part 483. Those
provisions establish hundreds of specific clinical, resident rights, operational
and other requirements.34
CMS evaluates compliance with the Long Term Care Requirements of
Participation via unannounced annual and “complaint” surveys, usually
conducted by a “State Survey Agency” (“SSA”), typically a State Health
Department, that acts under contract as CMS’ agent.35 CMS publishes various
manuals in which it describes in great detail both the substance of the
regulations and its survey procedures. These include the “State Operations
Manual,” a multi-thousand page tome in which CMS describes some five
hundred “tags,” or breakdowns, of the regulations.36 In the State Operations
Manual, CMS also provides instructions to surveyors regarding how a facility
can meet, or fail to meet, the requirement; the sorts of document reviews and
interviews surveyors must conduct (sometimes down to the script); and how
to evaluate the seriousness of any noncompliance.
A facility must remain in “substantial compliance” with the Long Term
Care Requirements of Participation, which is defined by regulation as “a level
of compliance with the requirements of participation such that any identified
deficiencies pose no greater risk to resident health or safety than the potential
for causing minimal harm.”37 This provision must be read in conjunction
with various provisions of the State Operations Manual under which

34. States also impose and enforce their own regulatory requirements, typically via
licensure requirements, most of which are similar, or even identical, to the federal certification
requirements. Some, but not all, states impose parallel licensure sanctions, and state appeals
processes vary considerably. Again, this Article addresses only the federal appeals process.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (2008). CMS also conducts some surveys directly, usually to
“look behind” the SSA’s performance, but the general process is the same.
36. The “State Operations Manual” is an online-only manual that CMS updates on an
ongoing basis. See generally CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PUB. NO. 100-07, STATE
OPERATIONS
MANUAL,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-IOMs-Items/CMS1201984.
37. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300 (1994), 488.330 (2011).
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surveyors assign a score to each cited “deficiency” from a table that describes
four levels of “severity” (potential for minimal harm, potential for more than
minimal harm, actual harm, and “immediate jeopardy’ to resident health and
safety), and three levels of “scope” (isolated, pattern, widespread). CMS’
enforcement regulation then assigns sanctions, for instance, the amount of a
CMP, based upon a finding of noncompliance, and this score.38
Surveyors are typically Registered Nurses, or professionals from other
pertinent disciplines, who are qualified to perform surveys by experience, and
by passing a CMS training course.39 In practice, CMS allows surveyors to
exercise “judgment” about how to interpret and apply both the regulations
and CMS’ Interpretive Guidelines to the regulations. For instance, CMS
manuals describe hundreds of examples of potentially inappropriate uses of
medications, and CMS allows surveyors to second-guess physician orders for
such medications.40 If the SSA finds noncompliance—and more than 90% of
nursing facilities are cited for some degree of noncompliance annually41—it
documents its “findings”—that is, its allegations of noncompliance—in a
written “Statement of Deficiencies.” The facility then must submit and
implement a written “Plan of Correction.”42 The regulations also require each
State to provide facilities with a process for an “informal dispute resolution”
of citations with which they disagree.43 Those processes vary considerably

38. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(b) (1994), 488.438 (2016). (A surveyor can cite
noncompliance that does not “have the potential for more than minimal harm”—the lowest
score on CMS’ ‘severity” and “scope” grid—which does not support imposition of any
sanction.).
39. The CMS training course consists of various “modules,” and so, for instance, a social
worker might pass the “nursing” module, and thus be “qualified” to evaluate and cite
noncompliance regarding complicated clinical issues, which can be the basis for disputes and
appeals. See STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 37, at §§ 4009 et seq.
40. In a typical recent decision, the Board imposed a civil money penalty in excess of $1.4
million against a nursing facility where a nurse surveyor disagreed with an order a resident’s
physician – who was not even a facility employee—had given limiting anesthesia for oral
surgery that had resulted in the surgery being delayed. Putnam Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2850
(2018). Board and ALJ decisions are reported on the Board’s website,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab/index.html.
41. See DHHS OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., TRENDS IN NURSING HOME DEFICIENCIES AND
COMPLAINTS, OIG REPORT NO. OEI-02-08-00140
(September
18,
2008),
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-08-00140.pdf. The overall trends in recent years have
been similar, although the average number of deficiencies per facility varies considerably from
state to state, a result the OIG and the Government Accountability Office have criticized for
many years.
42. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300(a) (1994); (a)(1)(D) (1994); 488.408(f) (2016).
43. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331 (2011).
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from state to state, from internal rubber-stamps, to informal hearings after
which hearing officers may set aside inappropriate citations.
The Social Security Act and CMS’ “Enforcement Regulations” then set
forth an “enforcement” system that authorizes CMS to impose sanctions
(known as “remedies”) for noncompliance, including civil money penalties
(“CMPs”) as high as $20,628 per day of noncompliance (which can total
millions of dollars);44 denials of payment for new Medicare/Medicaid
admissions (which can starve a facility);45 temporary third-party
management;46 state monitoring;47 directed plans of correction;48 directed
training;49and ultimately, “termination” from the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs (which usually operates as a regulatory death sentence).50 As noted
above, CMS manuals set forth an elaborate system of classifying violations by
“severity” and “scope,” and for matching various categories of violations to
specific remedies, although the regulations also accord CMS considerable
discretion regarding imposition of remedies.51 In most cases, the SSA
recommends, and CMS imposes, the remedy. Sometimes, a “Plan of
Correction” and SSA “revisit” to assure compliance is all that CMS requires
to address and correct relatively minor deficiencies. However, at the other
extreme, in about 2% of cases, CMS imposes enhanced CMPs running into
the millions of dollars for violations that pose “immediate jeopardy” to

44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h) (2014); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.430 et seq. (2011). The same statutory
provision authorizes all of the remedies discussed in the text. Note that 42 C.F.R. § 488.436(b)
provides for an automatic reduction of the CMP of 35% if the facility waives an appeal; in
effect, this provision puts a 35% penalty on choosing to appeal and gives CMS a 35% cushion
when negotiating settlement. (The regulation also provides for a 50% reduction in certain
circumstances where a facility self-reports a serious violation, but that provision is employed
very rarely.).
45. 42 C.F.R. § 488.417 (1995).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 488.415 (1994).
47. 42 C.F.R. § 488.422 (1995).
48. 42 C.F.R. § 488.424 (1994).
49. 42 C.F.R. § 488.425 (1995).
50. 42 C.F.R. § 488.456 (1994).
51. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408 (2016). Subsection 408(g)(2) specifically provides that a facility
may not appeal the “choice of remedy.” Remedies actually are imposed by CMS’ ten Regional
Offices, whose philosophies and practices differ considerably. For instance, some Regional
Office officials impose very large CMPs, while others believe that CMPs take resources from
resident care, and so focus on, say, directed plans of correction. Over the years, the DHHS
Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office have issued numerous
reports critical of this inconsistency, which persists, and vividly illustrates the difficulty of
imposing procedural limits even inside an agency.
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resident health and safety, defined as noncompliance that “has caused or is
likely to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a resident.”52
The Social Security Act provides that where CMS makes an adverse
finding, a facility is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before a neutral
administrative law judge to challenge the factual and legal bases for the
sanction.53 In 1994, CMS adopted regulations at 42 C.F.R. Part 498 that
provide for a trial-type adjudication before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) of what is now called the “Departmental Appeals Board” (“DAB” or
“Board”), to effectuate that right. At any given time, there are about half a
dozen ALJs who hear appeals in nursing facility cases (as well as appeals of
many other DHHS actions).54
Many courts have held that because Congress provided no express
exemption from the APA, the usual APA standards govern these Part 498
proceedings.55 The most basic “adjudication” rule under the APA is that the
“proponent of an order,” in this case, CMS, has the burden of proof to sustain
the order throughout a proceeding contesting the order.56 Thus, in their
earliest cases under Part 498, the Secretary’s ALJs and the courts recognized
that CMS had the burden under Part 498 to come forward with evidence to
support any factual allegations (or, as CMS calls them, “findings”) that CMS
identified as the “basis” for a sanction. The Secretary’s ALJs and the courts
also recognized that if the agency failed to do so, then the petitioner prevailed
“even if it offers no evidence at all.”57 If CMS established a “prima facie case”
of noncompliance (which no regulation defines, but which the Board
52. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2017).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii) (2014) (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7a).
54. See Dep’t Appeals Bd. (DAB), Who Are the Board Members & Judges?, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab.
55. See, e.g., Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. Dept. of Health and Human
Serv., 742 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2014); Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Grace Healthcare of Benton v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 589 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2009);
Liberty Commons—Johnston v. Leavitt, 241 Fed. Appx. 76 (4th Cir. 2007); Beechwood
Restorative Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 494 F. Supp. 2d 181 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (APA intended to provide uniform standard of review for agency
actions; Congress contemplated no judicial “rubber stamp” of such actions); W. Va. Dep’t of
Health v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Section 706(2)(A) to review Board
decision); S.C. Health & Human Servs. Finance Comm’n v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.
1990) (applying Sec. 706(2)(A) standard following hearing by comparable DHHS appeals
board).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1990); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
57. Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB No. 1611 (1997), aff’d, No. 98-3789 (D. N.J. 1999).
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basically says means allegations, which, if true, could support a finding of
noncompliance58), the burden then shifted to the petitioner to demonstrate
compliance with the regulation in question, typically by showing that its
staff’s actions met applicable standards of care, or by an affirmative defense
(typically that a resident had refused care) or that an adverse outcome was
clinically unavoidable (for instance, the natural progression of a disease
process). These principles became known as the “Hillman rule,” after the case
in which the Board first described them.
As outlined below, the Board has no generally applicable procedural rules
(other than for ministerial matters such as numbering of exhibits and the
like), so the ALJs establish their own hearing procedures.59 For example,
some ALJs require submission of “written direct testimony” before the
hearing, while others prefer to hear witnesses testify live. Hearings can take
anywhere from a few hours to several days, again, depending on an individual
ALJ’s preferences. Hearsay is admissible, but different ALJs accord different
weight to such evidence. In recent years, budget restrictions have required
ALJs to conduct hearings by videoconference (in the past the ALJ would
travel to a location near the appealing facility). The Board also has limited the
number of hearings, causing a significant backlog, also because of budget
issues. Thus, the number of ALJ and Board Decisions on the merits in
nursing facility appeals has dropped dramatically from fifty or more per year
to only a handful today, about half of which ALJs now decide by “summary
judgment” in favor of CMS (that is, without a hearing).60
Following the hearing (or summary judgment motion), an ALJ must issue
a written decision,61 and the losing party can request review by a threemember panel of the Board.62 The Board rarely entertains even oral
argument, almost always upholds CMS sanctions, and almost always reverses
every ALJ Decision in favor of a facility.63

58. For instance, the Board sometimes holds that the allegations in a Statement of
Deficiencies, without more, are sufficient to establish CMS’ “prima facie case,” and to shift the
burden of demonstrating compliance to the petitioner. See Southpark Meadows Nursing &
Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2703 (2016).
59. The Board’s general rules are at 42 C.F.R. pt. 498 (2008).
60. Board and ALJ decisions are available on the Board’s website,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab/index.html, and some are reported by commercial
services.
61. 42 C.F.R. § 498.74 (1996).
62. 42 C.F.R. § 498.80 (1996).
63. The author has tracked all ALJ. and Board decisions for about twenty years. Before
2010, nursing facilities won about one-third of ALJ decisions on the merits, and CMS rarely
appealed adverse decisions to the Board. Since 2010—when the Board changed its review
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Judicial review of Board Decisions is bifurcated: appeals of CMPs go
directly to the Court of Appeals and appeals of other sanctions to the District
Court.64 The courts apply the traditional review standard of Section
706(2)(A) of the APA, that is, the agency action will be set aside if “arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”65 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a,
which governs appeals of civil monetary penalties, also provides that the
standard of review of the Board’s findings of fact following an evidentiary
hearing is “substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole.”
IV. THE BOARD’S CURRENT APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS
In recent years, the Board’s administrative review process has rejected
virtually every aspect of the APA and has taken on a life of its own. The Board
largely has abandoned the Hillman rule described above, and now says that
it is not bound by APA standards, even though Congress has provided no
such exemption. The background for this rejection is murky, as neither the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, nor the Board, has ever explained
it in any official statement.
For instance, the Board has held in a series of cases over the past ten years
that it now considers all of the allegations in a “Statement of Deficiencies”—
including those a petitioner contests—to be “presumptively correct,” and that
a petitioner bears the burden throughout the proceeding somehow to

standard, discussed in the text—the number of ALJ decisions that completely set aside all
deficiencies and remedies has declined to only a handful a year, and during that time the Board
has reversed every ALJ decision in favor of a facility that CMS has appealed.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2018); 42 C.F.R. § 498.90 (1996).
65. See, e.g., Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 742 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2014); Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Grace Healthcare of Benton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 589 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2009);
Liberty Commons—Johnston v. Leavitt, 241 Fed. Appx. 76 (4th Cir. 2007). See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (APA intended to provide uniform standard of review for agency
actions; Congress contemplated no judicial “rubber stamp” of such actions); W. Va. Dep’t of
Health v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Sec. 706(2)(A) to review Board
decision); S.C. Health & Human Servs. Finance Comm’n v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.
1990) (applying Section 706(2)(A) standard following hearing by comparable DHHS appeals
board).
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“persuade” the Board otherwise.66 This position would seem directly to
conflict with Section 556(d) of the APA.67
The Board also has stated that it considers ALJ and Board review to be “de
novo,” and that it is not “restricted to the facts and evidence that were
available to CMS when it made its decision,” nor “how or why CMS decided
to impose remedies,” nor even the record developed in the Part 498 hearing.
According to the Board’s latest cases, it says it views the Part 498 review
process not to provide petitioners independent review of agency actions, but
only to provide an opportunity for the Board to act as “the final step in the
enforcement process,” and even to “fix” flawed CMS or ALJ determinations.68
Thus, the Board now specifically holds that its review of ALJ decisions is not
comparable to the independent “oversight role of a federal court in reviewing
agency decisions to determine if an adequate basis is articulated.”69 Not
incidentally, following its abandonment of the Hillman rule, the Board has
reversed every ALJ Decision in favor of a nursing facility that CMS has
appealed to it.70 No court has directly addressed most aspects of the Board’s
movement away from APA standards—at least not yet.71

66. See, e.g., Southgate Meadows Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2703 (2016);
St. Joseph Villa v. CMS, DAB No. 2210 (2008) (reversing summary judgment for a petitioner
where CMS relied only on the Statement of Deficiencies and offered no supporting evidence);
Barbourville Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB No. 1962 (2005).
67. In a typical description of the Board’s current iteration of the parties’ respective
burdens, the Board will uphold CMS sanctions where a petitioner does not “demonstrate that
the ALJ’s findings were not based on substantial evidence.” Plott Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB
No. 2426 (2011) (emphasis added).
68. As a result, the Board frequently constructs “post hoc rationalizations” for CMS
sanctions—that is, articulates a different basis for a sanction than the agency itself stated (and
the petitioner challenged—exactly what the Supreme Court held the APA prohibits in Citizens
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970). In the few cases that address this
point, the Board says that Overton Park applies only to judicial review, not its review.
69. Golden Living Ctr.—Riverchase v. CMS, DAB No. 2314 (2010); Beatrice St. Dev. Ctr.
v. CMS, DAB No. 2311 (2010); Britthaven of Chapel Hill v. CMS, DAB No. 2284 (2009); Cal
Turner Extended Care Pavilion v. CMS, DAB No. 2030 (2006).
70. The Board does occasionally reverse an ALJ summary judgment in favor of CMS
where the petitioner shows that the ALJ did not address and resolve material factual disputes
(while Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not directly apply to Board proceedings, the Board does say that
it applies Rule 56 principles to summary judgment motions).
71. The court in Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.2d 975, 985-89 (9th Cir. 2015),
held that because unaddressed citations of noncompliance can and do have continuing
enforcement consequences (for instance, CMS can and does rely on a facility’s enforcement
history when choosing sanctions), an ALJ cannot decline to review every deficiency that a
petitioner contests simply because he or she states that he or she could sustain the sanction on
the basis of a subset of all the citations. The Board rejects this analysis, and applies it, if at all,
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In fact, as discussed immediately below, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has long tried to limit review of CMS enforcement decisions,
and the Board usually has accommodated that effort, beginning with the
threshold issue of what enforcement determinations are appealable. One
recent development has accelerated that effort. Until recently CMS was
authorized to collect CMPs only after the conclusion of an appeal,72 but in
2010, as part of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress authorized CMS
to adopt regulations that “may” provide for collection or “escrow” of CMPs
pending appeals.73 In 2012 CMS proposed a draft regulation, now codified at
42 C.F.R. § 488.431(b), to implement this ACA provision. CMS explained its
rationale for the regulation in a lengthy official comment in which it noted a
series of reports by the Government Accountability Office and the DHHS
Inspector General that expressed concerns about “delays in payment of a civil
money penalty” (in fact, the cited reports actually critiqued delays by CMS in
processing survey documents and collecting CMPs after the completion of
appeals). But CMS also recited that the agency’s goal was “to eliminate a
facility’s ability to significantly defer the direct financial effect of an
applicable CMP until after an often long litigation process,” which CMS
specifically derided as a distraction from its enforcement prerogatives.74
CMS’ rationale for this rule is curious at best, for the Supreme Court has
held that the government may seize money or property prior to a hearing in
non-criminal cases only in “extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until
after the event.”75 Nevertheless, CMS dismissed commenters’ concerns about
the due process implications of seizing CMPs without prior administrative
only to cases originating in states that comprise the Ninth Circuit. Similarly, as noted below, a
District Court in Nebraska ordered the Board to hold a hearing in a case in which CMS had
withdrawn a remedy and argued that the case therefore did not trigger the right to a Part 498
hearing. Again, the Board disagrees, and has refused to schedule the hearing the court ordered.
Golden Living Ctr.—Grand Island Lakeview v. CMS, No. 8:11CV119 (D. Neb. Dec. 16, 2011)
(reversing DAB No. 2364 (2011).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(5) (2010) formerly provided that only denials of payment and
temporary managers “may be imposed during the pendency of any hearing;”42 C.F.R. §§
488.440(b) (2012), 488.442(a)(1) (2011), read together, formerly provided that civil monetary
penalties were payable fifteen days after a “final administrative decision” regarding a CMP.
The Affordable Care Act amended Sec. 1395i-3(h)(5) to add authority to collect CMPs during
pendency of the hearing.
73. Sec. 6111(a)(1) of the Affordable Care Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i3(h)(2)(b)(ii)(IV) (2014).
74. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Civil Money Penalties for Nursing Homes, 76 Fed.
Reg. 15106 (Mar. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 488).
75. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
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or judicial review, stating in its Official Comment that it would create a new
“independent informal dispute resolution process” (“IIDR”), in which
sanctioned parties could dispute deficiencies prior to, or as an alternative to
the appeal process. Congress thus provided IIDR as a due process
counterweight to escrow—the provisions are in the same statutory section—
but CMS routinely disregards or rejects IIDR recommendations in favor of
facilities.
The agency’s efforts to limit challenges to its enforcement decisions also
has been baked into its regulations. The administrative and judicial review
provisions of the Social Security Act appear, on their face, to allow challenges
to any enforcement determination or decision by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.76 But CMS’ appeal regulations, and the Board’s
interpretation and application of those regulations, erect significant
substantive limits on administrative appeals.77
Most importantly, the Secretary has implemented regulations that appear
to contradict the plain language of the statute that allows appeals of all
Secretarial adverse actions. 42 C.F.R. § 498.3 provides, the Board consistently
holds, that a facility may appeal only certain “initial determinations,” which
the Board defines to mean a finding of noncompliance that results in the
imposition of any enforcement remedy, but not the underlying deficiency itself
if CMS imposes no remedy.78 Thus, there is no right to appeal an adverse
informal dispute resolution decision;79 or an SSA or CMS rejection of a Plan
of Correction (even if that result leads to termination, which would be
appealable);80 or an SSA recommendation of a sanction.81
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(e), (g) and (h) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii) (2014)
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a).
77. 42 C.F.R. § 498 (2008) (especially 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(2012)).
78. The Secretary argued in her briefs and oral argument in Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000), that deficiencies could be appealed one way or another (for
instance, by accepting a small civil monetary penalty), and the Court specifically referred to
that representation in requiring that all such challenges must be “channeled” through the
Board. A federal district court suggested in Golden Living Ctr.—Grand Island Lakeview v.
CMS, No. 8:11CV119 (D. Neb. Dec. 16, 2011) (reversing DAB No. 2364 (2011), which found
that if the Board declines to conduct any review of an enforcement determination, then a court
might accept such an appeal on the merits in the first instance.). But the Board rejects that
analysis and has disregarded the Court’s Order (seven years later the Board has not reassigned
the case to an ALJ).
79. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331 (2011); see, e.g., Cap. Home Nursing and Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB
No. 2252 (June 10, 2009).
80. Great Lakes Healthcare v. CMS, A.L.J. Ruling No. 2016-14, 1-2 (July 25, 2016).
81. See Glenoaks Convalescent Hosp. v. CMS, A.L.J Ruling No. CR4805, 1-3 (March 7,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4805.pdf; Bruceville Terrace v. CMS,
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The Board also interprets Section 498.3 to mean that facilities may appeal
only remedies that persist through the appeal, and not the imposition of the
remedy itself. Thus, if CMS imposes but then withdraws a remedy, even
during the course of an otherwise properly perfected appeal (typically
because CMS fears it might lose on the merits), the Board will dismiss the
appeal. The Board consistently holds that the facility’s right to appeal even an
egregiously wrong violation is thereby vitiated, and so the citation remains
on the facility’s public record.82
The Board has also held that, notwithstanding the statutory language
that any “affected party” may contest an adverse enforcement determination,
only active Medicare providers may initiate appeals of enforcement
determinations, even if the facility nevertheless is “affected by” the
determination. Thus, the Board has held that a Medicaid-only facility may
not appeal termination of its Medicaid Provider Agreement (unless CMS
itself terminated the Agreement).83 Likewise, the Board has held that a
Medicare certified facility that for some reason has an inactive Medicare
Provider number may not appeal an enforcement action.84 The Board
recently dismissed an appeal because the party filing the appeal could not
A.L.J.
Ruling
No.
2016-8,
at
1-2
(Feb.
1,
2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2016/alj2016-8.pdf.
82. There are dozens of cases illustrating this point. See, e.g., Fountain Lake Health &
Rehab.
Ctr.
v,
CMS,
DAB
Dec.
No.
1985
(July
6,
2005),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2005/dab1985.htm; Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1607 (Jan. 20,
1997),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/1997/dab1607.html; Sunset Villa v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1683 (Nov. 2, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1683.pdf;
Gulf Pointe Specialty Hosp. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1651 (Sep. 17, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1651.pdf;
Grace Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1647 ( Sep. 14, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1647.pdf;
Colonial Oaks Guest Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1618 (June 29, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1618.pdf;
Corpus Christi Nursing & Rehab. V. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1616 (June 26, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1616.pdf;
Twin Pines Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1601 (May 25, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1601.pdf;
Heritage Manor of Franklinton v. HCFA, ALJ Dec. No. CR666 (May 2, 2000),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2000/cr666.html.
83. Bryn Mawr Care v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2277, 1-2 (Nov. 1, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2277.pdf.
84. Guild Home for the Aged Blind v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2437, 1-2, 5-7, 9 (Sep. 26,
2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/aljdecisions/2011/cr2437.pdf.
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show that it actually controlled the facility at the time it initiated the appeal.85
CMS once successfully persuaded a Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal of
a CMP where a successor operator paid the penalty, even though the
petitioner would have received a refund had it prevailed.86
The Board also consistently holds that ALJs have very limited authority.
The Board says that ALJs do not have the authority to enter stays or
injunctions,87 to review whether a regulation is consistent with the governing
statute,88 to review CMS’ choice of remedy (e.g., an ALJ cannot decide that a
deficiency exists but warrants only a CMP and not termination),89 to review
IDR determinations,90 to review claims of bias,91 to review constitutional
claims,92 or to review CMS’ failure to promulgate its survey and enforcement
policies via the “notice and comment” provisions of the APA.93 In a recent
case, an ALJ set aside a survey finding on the ground that the survey team did
not include a registered nurse, which the statute and regulations specifically
require; the Board reversed that Decision on the ground that an ALJ may not

85. Sunview Care & Rehab Ctr. LLC, DAB Dec. No. 2713, 1 (June 15, 2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2016/dab2713.pdf.
86. Jennifer Matthew Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. DHHS, 607 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 2010).
87. See, e.g., Palm Grove Convalescent Ctr. v. HCFA, ALJ Docket No. C-99-12 (1999)
(unreported).
88. See, Dir. of the Office for Civil Rights v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., ALJ
Dec. No. CR5111, 3 (June 1, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr5111.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Beverly Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1696 (July 1, 1999),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/1999/dab1696.htm; Aase Haugen Homes, Inc. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1273 (Jan.
31,
2005),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/aljdecisions/2005/CR1273.htm.
90. Rutland Nursing Home v. CMS, ALJ Ruling 2014-12, 5 (November 8, 2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2013/alj201412.pdf.
91. Jewish Home of E. Pa. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2421, 5-6 (Aug. 30, 2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/cr2421.pdf.
92. Carrington Place of Muscatine v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2321, 23-24 (June 25, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2321.pdf.
93. See, e.g., Orchard Grove Extended Care Ctr. v. HCFA, ALJ Dec. No. CR541, 3, 5 (July
20,
1998),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/aljdecisions/1998/cr541.PDF; Green Oaks Hosp. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR861 (Jan. 28, 2002),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2002/cr861.html.

246

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:223

consider violations of the survey process where there are otherwise
appropriate citations.94
The Board does permit appeals that challenge only the duration of
noncompliance (and thus the duration of a “per diem” CMP). In other words,
a petitioner can concede noncompliance but offer evidence and argument
that it resumed compliance on an earlier date than CMS says, and so the per
diem penalty likewise should end sooner than CMS found.95 It also
theoretically possible for a petitioner to concede noncompliance but argue
that any deficiency did not pose the risk of more than minimal harm and thus
cannot support a sanction.96
While not strictly an APA issue, the Board’s regulations require that a
nursing facility must file its “Request for Hearing” within 60 calendar days
after receipt of the CMS Notice imposing a remedy—not within 60 days after
the effective date of the remedy.97 This can be very problematic where a
facility receives a Notice imposing a remedy that will become effective at a
future date if the facility does not correct a deficiency and resume compliance
before that date, because the Board says that the 60 days runs from the receipt
of the Notice even in such a case (when the appeal may wind up being moot).
There are dozens of decisions dismissing appeals where the facility misses
this deadline by even one day.98 While the regulation does provide that the
Board may extend this deadline upon a showing of “good cause”—the Board
has held that CMS does not have such authority99—the Board has conceded
that it never has defined “good cause,” and there never has been a case where
an ALJ or the Board has found that any circumstance constitutes “good
cause” for extending the filing deadline.100
94. Avon Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2830, 10-11 (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2830.pdf, rev’g Dallas Home Health Care,
Inc. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. 4760 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/aljcr4760.pdf.
95. See, e.g., Libertyville Manor Rehab. & Health Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2849
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2849.pdf.
96. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(b), 488.438; supra n. 38.
97. 42 C.F.R. § 498.40(a)(2).
98. Knox County Nursing Home v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1588, 3 (Apr. 19, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1588.pdf
(two days late).
99. West Side House LTC Facility v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2791, 7 (May 18, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2791.pdf.
100. Brookside Rehab. & Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2094 (June 27, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2007/dab2094.pdf. Some fact patterns illustrate fairly extreme circumstances, such
as the case of a physician whose Medicare exclusion appeal was dismissed notwithstanding his
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Whether a particular set of facts constitutes noncompliance is a mixed
question of fact and law: whether the agency’s allegations are accurate and
complete, and whether the regulatory provision reaches the alleged act or
omission. However, the Board resists the notion that the legal part of the
analysis consists of “elements” similar to civil or criminal claims.101 Likewise,
the Board allows ALJs to infer more general violations, for instance, “neglect,”
“inadequate administration,” or failure of “quality assurance,” solely from a
violation of a more specific requirement.102
The Board also allows an ALJ to grant summary disposition in favor of
CMS without stating that he or she even considered a petitioner’s evidence.103
The Board recites that the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 “guides” its consideration of summary judgment motions104—
argument that he never received the applicable notice because he was in jail; the Board held
that he did not overcome the “presumption” that he received the notice three days after it was
mailed. Kenneth Schrager, DAB Dec. No. 2366, 1-2, 5 (May 15, 2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2011/dab2366.pdf. For what it is worth, attorney error (divorce, etc.) is not “good
cause.” Heritage Park Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2028, 4 (Nov. 12, 2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2009/CR2028.pdf.
See also Ada Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Ruling 2014-10 (Nov. 4, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2013/alj201410.pdf; Parkside Surgery Inst. V. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2319 (Feb. 9, 2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/cr2319.pdf.
101. Thus, for instance, the Board says that it is immaterial if CMS cites the wrong
regulatory provision if it can derive any other basis for noncompliance from the record. See,
e.g., Avalon Place Trinity v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2819 (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2819.pdf; Kindred Transitional Care &
Rehab.—Greenfield,
DAB
Dec.
No.
2792
(May
18,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2792.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Heritage Place Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2829 (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2829.pdf.
103. No ALJ ever has granted summary judgment in favor of a facility. In the past, ALJs
regularly ruled that where CMS failed to offer a prima facie case of noncompliance on one or
another citation under Hillman, the petitioner did not have to defend such citations. Now,
while some ALJs entertain the equivalent of a Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion
of CMS’ case, even those who do so will reserve decision, usually on the ground that 42 C.F.R.
§ 498.63 provides CMS the right to file a written brief on any citation it alleges. Some ALJs
even allow CMS to argue citations for the first time in briefs for which they have offered no
evidence—and thus no prima facie case of noncompliance—at the hearing. See, e.g., Donelson
Place Care & Rehab. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR5132 (2018) (sustaining a citation for which
CMS offered no evidence).
104. Cedar Lake Nursing Home, DAB Dec. No. 2344, 2 (Nov. 18, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2344.pdf (holding that Rule 56 does not govern its proceedings, but only
provides “guidance”). There are actually many judicial decisions that recite that administrative
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that is, that the party seeking summary judgment must offer evidence
regarding every element of the claim in question, the evidence must be
construed against the party seeking summary judgment, and all inferences
that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence must be resolved against the
moving party.105 But the Board actually does not follow this rule in practice.
For instance, the Board does not follow the usual rule courts apply in
administrative enforcement cases that an unsworn charging document (the
Statement of Deficiencies) is not considered to be “evidence” for purposes of
Rule 56. This is because granting summary judgment on the basis of such
unsworn allegations has the effect of reversing the burdens of production and
proof established by the Rule.106 In fact, ALJs routinely draw inferences for
purposes of summary judgment against facilities, even where CMS offers
nothing beyond the Statement of Deficiencies.107 There are numerous
Decisions in which ALJs reject the opinions of expert affiants, medical
journals, and the like, as insufficient to create material issues of fact.108 The
Board does occasionally reverse ALJ Decisions granting summary judgment
to CMS,109 but there is no pattern to such cases, and it also frequently affirms

agencies that employ summary proceedings must follow Rule 56. Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v.
Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 747 (6th Cir. 2004) (DAB case); see also, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct
& Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 604-607 (1st Cir. 1994); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. USDA, 832 F.2d
601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. FERC, 806 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
See generally CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.42 (2d. ed. 1997).
105. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-252 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586-7 (1986).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Menendez, 48 F.3d 1401, 1414 (5th Cir. 1995).
107. See, e.g., Life Care Ctr. of Merrimack Valley v. CMS, CR4965 (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4965.pdf.
108. See, e.g., Senior Rehab. & Skilled Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2300, 5 (Jan. 29,
2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2300.pdf; Oak Ridge Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4865, 6-7 (June 13,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4865.pdf.
109. See, e.g., NMS Healthcare of Hagerstown v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2803, 1 (July 20,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab2803.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No.
CR3772
(2015),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/aljdecisions/2015/cr3772.pdf (notably holding that even if CMS’ evidence establishes a prima
facie case of noncompliance, that is not sufficient to support summary judgment); Grace
Living Ctr.—Nw. OKC v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2633, 1 (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2015/dab2633.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR3347
(2014),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2014/cr3347.pdf;
Hanover Hill Health Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2507 (Apr. 10, 2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
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summary disposition even when the petitioner contests the accuracy of CMS’
material factual allegations.
If a case does proceed to hearing—perhaps 10% of filed cases do so—CMS
at least theoretically bears the initial burden of proceeding. That is, the agency
must offer evidence regarding each element of each allegation of
noncompliance the petitioner disputes in order to establish a “prima facie
case” of noncompliance.110 As noted, the Board specifically held in its seminal
decisions/2013/dab2507.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR2617
(2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2012/cr2617.pdf;
Pleasant
View
Ctr.,
DAB
Dec.
No.
2488,
1
(Dec.
6,
2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2012/dab2488.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR2546
(2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2012/cr2546.pdf;
Elant
at
Fishkill,
DAB
Dec.
No.
2468,
1-2
(July
11,
2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2012/dab2468.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR2465
(2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/cr2465.pdf;
Va. Highlands Health Rehab. Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2339, 1 (Sep. 30, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2339.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR2083
(2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2083ok.pdf;
Holy Cross Vill. at Notre Dame, Inc., v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2291, 1 (Dec. 21, 2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/dab2291.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR1951
(2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2009/CR1951.pdf;
Ill. Knights Templar Home v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2274, 1 (Sep. 30, 2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/dab2274.pdf,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR1879
(2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2009/CR1879.pdf;
St. Catherine’s Care Ctr. of Findlay, Inc., v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1964 (Feb. 25, 2005),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2005/dab1964.htm,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR1190
(2004),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2004/CR1190.htm;
Lebanon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1918 (April 19, 2004),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2004/dab1918.html,
rev’ing
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR1069
(2003),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2003/CR1069.html.
110. See Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1611 (Feb. 28, 1997),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/1997/dab1611.html, aff’d, Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, No. 98-3789 (D.N.J. May
13, 1999) (unpublished opinion); Cross Creek Health Care Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1665
(July
14,
1998),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/1998/dab1665.html. At least one old Board decision indicated that CMS had the
burden to offer evidence regarding each deficiency it presses at the hearing (or else
unsupported citations would be set aside). See W. Care Mgmt. Corp. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No.
1921 (May 10, 2004), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
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Hillman case that if CMS fails to meet this burden, then the petitioner
prevails even if it offers no evidence at all.
However, the Board’s application of this rule is at best unclear. First, as
noted above, the Board does not allow an ALJ to render the equivalent of a
directed verdict after CMS’ case, thus essentially vitiating that aspect of
Hillman.111
Second, as discussed above, the APA provides that the “proponent of a
rule or order” bears the burden to sustain that order, but the Board has held,
variously, that it is not subject to the APA rules regarding burdens of proof
at all. Or, if the Board addresses APA burdens at all, it says that it is the
petitioner who is the “proponent of an order” relieving it of the sanction—
which obviously is not the intent of Section 556(d)—and so the petitioner
bears the burden of “persuasion” that it was in compliance with whatever
regulation is at issue.112
Thus, in some recent cases, the Board has absolved CMS from coming
forward with anything at a hearing beyond the Statement of Deficiencies
(which, the Board says, can be taken as “evidence” of its contents), and thus it
is the petitioner’s burden to disprove CMS’ allegations.113 As noted above,

decisions/2004/dab1921.html. However, the Board now says that it can uphold a sanction if
CMS manages to offer a prima facie case on any cited deficiency, and that the remaining
citations simply will remain on the record, with the petitioner’s challenge undecided. Plott
Nursing
Home
v.
CMS,
DAB
Dec.
No.
2426
(Dec.
6,
2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2011/dab2426.pdf.
111. Although, the Board does require that the petitioner nevertheless make a motion to
that effect on the ground that CMS failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, or else the
argument is deemed waived.
112. See, e.g., Batavia Nursing & Convalescent Inn v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1911 (Mar. 1,
2004),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2004/dab1911.html.
113. See, e.g., Southpark Meadows Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2703 (May 20,
2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2016/dab-2703.pdf. The application of this rule is demonstrated in cases such as
Golden Living Ctr.—Riverchase v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. CR2012 (Sept. 30, 2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2314.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. 2012 (2009), in which an ALJ held that CMS
had failed to establish a prima facie case of noncompliance where CMS’ witnesses could not
explain how a resident fell or suffered an injury during a transfer, but the Board reversed and
held that it was the facility’s burden to demonstrate that its staff had not violated any
regulation.
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ALJs will sometimes sustain deficiencies even where CMS offers no evidence
beyond a Statement of Deficiencies.114
The Board has also held that CMS has no burden to produce any specific
evidence to support an “immediate jeopardy” determination—even though
the plain language of the regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 488.301, recites specific
elements: noncompliance that “has caused or is likely to cause death or serious
harm.” Likewise, the Board holds that it is the petitioner’s burden to
demonstrate that the determination is “clearly erroneous.”115 Some poorly
worded Board Decisions even suggest that some ALJs apply this rule to find
a “presumption” in favor of the merits of any “immediate jeopardy” citation
as well.116
At the same time, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e), which governs appeals of
CMPs, specifically provides that the standard of review of a determination of
noncompliance is the traditional “substantial evidence in the record, taken as
a whole,” with factual disputes determined by a “preponderance of the
evidence.” The Board’s “Guidelines for Review” provide that the same
standard governs the administrative review.117
Again, however, the Board does not follow these rules. First, it typically
says that it requires only “substantial evidence” to uphold CMS “findings”
(allegations), which is a far lower standard than the statute actually requires,
and which allows an ALJ to disregard a facility’s evidence supporting a factual
or legal defense.118 Thus, in recent cases, ALJs have rejected clinicians’

114. See, e.g., Donelson Place Care & Rehab. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR5132 (2018); Life
Care Ctr. of Merrimack Valley v. CMS, CR4965 (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4965.pdf.
115. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301; see, e.g., Daughters of Miriam Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2067
(Feb.
9,
2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2007/dab2067.pdf (holding that the Social Security Act prohibits CMS from offering
evidence in support of an “immediate jeopardy” determination).
116. See, e.g., Century Care of Crystal Coast v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2076 (April 10, 2007),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2007/dab2076.pdf, aff’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR1488 (2006).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e); The courts do agree with this rule. See, e.g., Woodstock Care
Ctr. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2003).
118. According to one court:
There is a notable difference between “substantial evidence” and “substantial
evidence in the record as a whole.” “Substantial evidence” is merely such
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole,” however, requires
a more scrutinizing analysis. In the review of an administrative decision, “the
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
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reliance on formal clinical standards promulgated by professional
organizations such as the American Diabetes Association and the American
Medical Directors Association as “irrelevant” to CMS’ enforcement
prerogatives.119 They have rejected considering the findings and analysis of
State ALJs in parallel State appeals (even though the Supreme Court has held
that federal administrative agencies must apply “issue preclusion” rules such
as res judicata and collateral estoppel to prior state decisions).120 They now
routinely second-guess clinical decisions by residents’ physicians,
pharmacists and other professionals, and then impute liability for such
“errors” to facilities.121 They have based sanctions on critiques of apparently
unremarkable facility policies.122
More importantly, the Board has stated in several recent Decisions that it
considers ALJ and Board review of both CMS’ factual allegations and legal
conclusions to be “de novo.”123 As noted above, the Board says that it does
not consider its review “restricted to the facts and evidence that were available
to CMS when it made its decision,” nor “how or why CMS decided to impose
detracts from its weight.” Thus the court must also take into consideration the
weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence that
is contradictory.
Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
119. See, e.g., Oak Ridge Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4865 (June 13, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4865.pdf.
120. See, e.g., Rockcastle Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4926 (Aug. 17,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4926.pdf. Compare Astoria Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Solomino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S.
461 (1982); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); United States v. Utah Constr.
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Stallings v. Goshen Dairy Stores, Inc., 89 F.3d 835 (6th Cir.
1998); E. Food & Liquor, Inc. v. United States, 50 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1995); Darden v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Ky. Cabinet for Human Res., 774 F.2d
1162 (6th Cir. 1985).
121. See, e.g., Golden Living Ctr.—Superior, DAB Dec. No. 2768 (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab2768. (The facility violated regulation by
following the Medical Director’s decision—following a specific State guideline—not to order
prophylactic Tamiflu until several residents diagnosed with flu); Asistencia Villa Rehab. &
Care
Ctr.
v.
CMS,
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR4947
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4947.pdf (The facility violated a regulation by
following a physician’s order to administer medications that ALJ read “black box warning” to
restrict).
122. Golden Living Ctr.—Trussville v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4916 (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4916.pdf (A nurse followed facility policy by
seeking help to deal with an intoxicated visitor).
123. Historically, and as recently as 2004, the Board specifically said that its review was not
de novo. N. Mont. Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1930 (2004). The Board has never made
public the reason for this fundamental change in position.
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remedies,” and so it says it has the authority to sustain sanctions on new
theories or grounds that a petitioner never had the opportunity to
challenge.124
The Board also does not consider its decisions to be “precedential,” and so
ALJs and the Board frequently render conflicting decisions on even the most
basic procedural and substantive issues.125 And the Board specifically has held
that it is not bound by CMS’ “Interpretive Guidelines” set forth in the “State
Operations Manual.”126 As a result, the case reports are filled with decisions
that announce diametrically opposite requirements based on near-identical
facts, or results that are inconsistent with commonly accepted current
standards of practice.127
In some case reports, it is impossible to determine the actual evidentiary
basis for a decision, since both ALJs and the Board routinely announce that
the petitioner has offered “no evidence” on an issue, or that petitioner’s
evidence and witnesses are “unpersuasive.” But some reviewing courts have
suggested that there are due process limits to this sort of subjective decisionmaking, and that CMS and the Board cannot impose sanctions without clear

124. Britthaven of Chapel Hill v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2284 (Nov. 17, 2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/dab2284.pdf. This position is contrary to the seminal APA case Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970), in which the Supreme Court held
that agency action taken on one ground may not be sustained on a “post hoc rationalization”
first articulated during an appeal of the action.
125. See, e.g., W. Tex. LTC Partners, Inc., d/b/a Cedar Manor, DAB Dec. No. 2652 (Sept.
1,
2015),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2015/dab-2652.pdf; Green Oaks Health & Rehab. Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2567 (Mar. 31,
2014),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2014/dab2567.pdf; Lopatcong Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2443 (Mar. 6, 2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2012/dab2443.pdf; Universal Healthcare—King v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2383 (June
3,
2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2011/dab2383.pdf.
126. Foxwood Springs Living Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2294 (Dec. 31, 2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/dab2294.pdf. Petitioners frequently argue that the Interpretive Guidelines are
not binding law because CMS did not promulgate them according to the notice and comment
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (which is an accurate recitation of the law). In
many instances, the Interpretive Guidelines do provide a useful analytic structure for
reviewing evidence of compliance, but some ALJs reject them even for that purpose.
127. See, e.g., Oak Ridge Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4865 (June 13, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4865.pdf
(rejecting
American
Diabetes
Association guidelines, and testimony by author of such guidelines).
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prior notice of the standards to which a facility will be held. However, the
Board routinely rejects such due process limits on its decision making.128
The Board routinely holds that CMS need not offer evidence on every
deficiency it cited in support of a sanction and that ALJs need not address
every deficiency a petitioner contests, if CMS argues, and the ALJ can find,
that a sanction could be, or can be, supported by fewer than all of the
originally cited deficiencies. One court specifically has rejected this policy,129
one has questioned it,130 and at least one has sustained it.131
And the Board routinely holds that misstatements of evidence or
standards of care by ALJs constitute “harmless error.”132
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No informed observer would argue that the overall quality of care in
nursing facilities is worse today than it was in 1987.133 Given the advances in
medical science, there are many residents today who would not even have
been alive thirty years ago with similar levels of physical or mental debility.
Nurse training is far better today than thirty years ago; clinical systems are
more robust; there are many more physicians who have expertise and

128. See, e.g., Carrington Place of Muscatine v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2321 (June 25, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2321.pdf.
129. Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2015).
130. Grace Healthcare of Benton v. DHHS, 589 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2009).
131. Claiborne-Hughes Health Ctr. v. Sebelius, 609 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2010).
132. See, e.g., Longwood Healthcare Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2394 (June 30, 2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2011/dab2394.pdf; Life Care Ctr. of Tullahoma v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2304 (March
5,
2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2304 (The ALJ improperly held that the standard of care requires
consultation with physician before providing diabetes care per protocol, but the deficiency
critiquing protocol was nevertheless upheld); Plum City Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2272
(Sep.
29,
2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/dab2272.pdf.
133. As noted in the text, the 1986 IOM Report focused on structural aspects of “quality”—
staffing, formalized assessments and care plans, resident rights, and the like. Today, CMS
publishes “quality indicators” collected from aggregate assessment data that include items
such as the number of residents who have fallen, the number who have new or worsened skin
breakdowns, the number who use psychotropic medications, etc. See Quality Measures, CTRS.
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.
(last
updated
Mar.
5,
2019),
FOR
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality-initiatives-patient-assessmentinstruments/nursinghomequalityinits/nhqiqualitymeasures.html. Whether or not such data
are useful in the aggregate, they rarely offer insights into the care of specific residents.

2019]

NURSING FACILITY ENFORCEMENT

255

experience in treating geriatric patients nearing the end of life; many facilities
employ nurse practitioners, who barely existed thirty years ago; and even the
most remote “mom and pop” facility has access to state of the art clinical
systems, electronic medical records, expert consultants, and the like, that
were not widely available in pre-Internet days.
The regulatory process arguably has not kept up with these developments,
but more to the point of this paper, ALJ and Board Decisions continue to be
based upon broad assertions about noncompliance similar to those CMS
made decades ago, reinforced by “presumptions” that such arguments
overcome a petitioner’s evidence, even about current standards of care.
A principal reason that the enforcement process has not been able to
address this disconnect is the unwillingness of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services and his Appeals Board to require and employ, respectively,
the rigorous standard of review the APA requires. As suggested above,
regulation of health and safety is a vital government function, and the
government ought to be able to use the enforcement process to weed out poor
facilities. CMS should win every case it brings on the merits, not by cutting
corners or restricting review, but because surveyors, supervisors, ALJs and
the Board focus on enforcement of clear operational and clinical standards.
Instead, both surveyors and ALJs increasingly see themselves as armed
with general warrants to critique specific professional judgments and facility
“systems”—sometimes without regard to actual standards of care—and to
work backward from unwanted resident outcomes to find some regulatory
violation, which may or may not have caused the outcome, in order to impose
blame. As a result, the enforcement process has increasingly drifted away
from applying accepted clinical and quality standards to identify facilities
that do not or cannot provide appropriate care. Instead, the process has
drifted toward rooting out and punishing real or perceived errors, omissions
and bad outcomes, no matter the cause, how isolated, or how implausible it
may be that a cited error could cause any actual harm to one or more
residents.134
So why do facilities even bother appealing, and what is to be done?
At least until recent years, facilities did regularly win appeals. Surveyors
sometimes do exaggerate or misunderstand the facts, and State Survey
Agencies, CMS and ALJs do misapply regulations.135 Occasionally, an ALJ
134. See, e.g., The Bridge at Rockwood v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4978 (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4978.pdf (making a wide-ranging critique of
facility’s hiring, admission, care planning, staffing, and supervision “systems” not directly
related to resident-to-resident altercation ostensibly at issue).
135. See, e.g., Heartland Health Care Ctr.—Kendall v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4704 (Sep.
15, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4704.pdf (holding the facility not
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holds that cited noncompliance was technical, or could not pose the risk of
more than minimal harm, and thus could not support a sanction.136 An
appeal may reduce a huge penalty to one of more manageable size. For
instance, some appeals challenge only the duration of lengthy “per diem”
CMPs. In those cases, the facility concedes noncompliance but asserts that it
corrected the deficiencies and resumed compliance sooner than CMS says—
and some petitioners do prevail in such cases.137 ALJs or the Board sometimes
do find that the amount of a CMP is unreasonable.138 And the actual audience
for an administrative appeal may be the Court of Appeals, as several recent
Court decisions limit the ability of CMS and the Board to impose sanctions
based on ad hoc standards.139
responsible for a resident falling from her wheelchair while her son was pushing her around
the facility grounds); Kingsville Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2234 (Mar. 19,
2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/DAB2234.pdf, remanding CR1832 (2008) (holding that ALJ improperly
interpreted facility documents); Lake Country Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2380
(June
6,
2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/aljdecisions/2011/cr2380.pdf (finding that the evidence did not support CMS’ argument about
timing of resident illness); Country Hills Health Care v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2291 (Dec. 13,
2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/aljdecisions/2010/cr2291.pdf (holding the fatal accident unforeseeable); Life Care Ctr. of
Jefferson
City
v.
CMS,
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR2115
(Apr.
20,
2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2115.pdf
(setting aside a citation where resident suffered sudden unexpected death); Quality Care
Health
Ctr.
v.
CMS,
ALJ
Dec.
No.
CR2101
(Apr.
1,
2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2101.pdf
(finding that the evidence showed that the nurse did consult with a physician on a timely basis
regarding the bleeding).
136. See, e.g., Bella Vista Healthcare Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2451 (Oct 12, 2011),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/crd2451.pdf
(holding the notice of transfer was technically inadequate, but finding that the resident had
actual notice and chose a new facility, so there was no risk for harm); Heritage Healthcare &
Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Decision No. CR2116 (Apr. 20, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2116.pdf
(finding that the hot water exceeded the standard, but it was not hot enough to cause harm).
137. See, e.g., The Springs at the Watermark v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR5064 (2018)
(sustaining the noncompliance but reducing the duration and CMP); Kindred Transitional
Care and Rehab. – Greenfield v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4659 (July 12, 2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2016/cr4659.pdf,
aff’d, DAB Dec. No. 2792 (2017) (same).
138. See, e.g., Life Care Ctr. of Tullahoma v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2304 (Mar. 5, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2304.pdf.
139. Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2015); Elgin Nursing & Rehab.
Ctr. v. DHHS, 718 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2013); Grace Healthcare of Benton v. DHHS, 589 F.3d
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Moreover, there are several collateral reasons nursing facilities continue to
contest deficiencies and sanctions they believe are unwarranted, even if an
appeal to the Board is unlikely to be successful. Survey findings, even if
unwarranted, can and do support civil actions;140 Inspector General
investigations;141 “worthless services” claims; a host of collateral state and
federal administrative consequences, including reimbursement penalties,
adverse certificate of need consequences (that is, requests for approval of new
facilities or services);142 “special focus facility” designation (increased survey
attention to facilities that have had especially bad survey histories);143 poor
public ratings,144 and the like. Some states base licensure sanctions on specific
survey citations.145 Most commercial insurers limit participation in provider
926 (8th Cir. 2009); Emerald Shores Health Care Assocs. v. DHHS, 545 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir.
2008). See also, Cal Turner Extended Care Pavilion v. DHHS, 501 Fed. Appx. 502 (6th Cir.
Oct. 5, 2012). In one recent remarkable case, a Court of Appeals panel informed CMS during
the hearing that it was not inclined to uphold an “abuse” finding and that CMS should settle
the case (which it did). Oral Argument, Ridgecrest Healthcare v. Burwell, No. 14-75538 (9th
Cir.
Oct.
20,
2016),
available
on
the
Court’s
website
at
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000010401.
140. See, T. Andrew Graham & Joseph Bianculli, “The Intersection of Regulatory and
Personal Injury Litigation,” a paper prepared for American Health Lawyers Association Long
Term Care and the Law Program, Feb. 2015, available at healthlawyers.org.
141. At any given time, the DHHS Inspector General has several active investigations of
general nursing facility operational issues underway. See Active Work Plan Items, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-andpublications/workplan/active-item-table.asp. The OIG also conducts investigations of
individual facilities, sometimes based on adverse survey findings.
142. For instance, many states review the “track record” of applicants for new services or
acquisitions, and some specifically ask applicants to report adverse survey findings at existing
facilities. See, e.g., Oklahoma certificate of need procedures and forms at
ok.gov/health/Protective_Health/Health_Facility_System_/Nursing_Home_Certificate_of_
Need/#UnofficialCONRule.
143. See
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-andCertification/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/index.html.
144. CMS publishes “ratings” on a one-to-five “star” system based on, among other things,
survey citations, staffing data, and certain other criteria. See Nursing Home Compare,
MEDICARE. GOV, medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare. Nationwide, the ratings are basically on
a bell curve, with relatively few “one star” and “five star” facilities, but due to quirks in the
calculation process, the ratings vary considerably from state to state and within states. There
are many areas that have no four- or five-star facilities. Moreover, one bad deficiency can
adversely affect the published rating for several years.
145. For instance, the Texas Nursing Facility Licensure Act, Section 242.061 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code, provides for mandatory license revocation if a facility is cited for three
“immediate jeopardy” “abuse or neglect” citations in three years—but only after final appeals
are completed. TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 242.061(a-2)(1).
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networks to facilities that have good survey records.146 Evidence and
argument from even unsuccessful appeals—especially surveyor testimony
that otherwise is unavailable in discovery in civil proceedings—may be useful
for such collateral proceedings (and some defense counsel encourage appeals
of enforcement sanctions that could have civil counterparts for that reason).
The principal reason to appeal may well be psychological, that is, to support
staff, who sometimes simply need someone to hear their side of the story.
The reality is that some version of the current survey and enforcement
system is likely to remain in place indefinitely, even though the enforcement
process has arguably failed even on its own terms, as it does not—and, as
currently structured and operated, cannot—reliably identify consistently
poorly performing facilities, which was Congress’s goal when it enacted
OBRA ‘87, and which seems a reasonable goal today.147 For instance, under
the current system, surveyors could inspect two facilities next door to one
another, both of which say they specialize in rehabilitation after hip
replacements. One might send every resident home happy and well within a
couple weeks; the other might send many residents back to the hospital with
infections, generate numerous complaints, and the like. However, because
the enforcement and appeal process as currently operated does not
distinguish them on those bases, surveyors could cite the facility that every
reasonable person would consider to be “good” for (perhaps even trivial)
noncompliance, but not cite the “bad” facility for anything—and the Board
would have no problem with that result.148

146. For instance, most commercial insurance networks require nursing facilities to
maintain three-star, or even four-star CMS ratings (supra note 144) to participate in preferred
provider networks.
147. For instance, ALJs frequently impose enhanced sanctions based on a facility’s
supposedly poor “history” under 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(f)(1), even though nearly every facility is
cited for some noncompliance every year. In one recent case, an ALJ sustained a termination
action because of a series of supposedly uncorrected deficiencies, even though the evidence
showed that a CMS official told the SSA to “go back as far as you need to find something,” and
so the SSA simply kept re-citing the same (trivial) citations, including examples that predated
previously-accepted corrective actions. Donelson Place Care & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec.
No. CR 5132 (2018).
148. The author has been using this hypothetical example for many years, and never once
has a CMS official or counsel objected that it is not true. In fact, some research suggests that
not only is there no relationship between the current survey and enforcement process and
traditional measures of “quality,” but, perversely, there may even be an inverse relationship;
that is, that there is no correlation between survey citations and tort findings of poor quality.
R. Tamara Konetzka, et al., Malpractice Litigation and Nursing Home Quality of Care, 48
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1920, (2013); David G. Stevenson et al., Does Litigation Increase or
Decrease Health Care Quality?, 51 MED. CARE 430 (2013); David M. Studdert et al.,
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The result is that CMS now routinely tries sloppy cases based on little more
than a surveyor’s disagreement with—or even lack of knowledge about—
specific clinical decisions nurses or even physicians have actually made;
speculation about potential adverse outcomes or hypothetical harm;
emotional appeals; or boilerplate assertions to the effect that facilities must
protect residents against “neglect,” and the like. This practice is plainly
encouraged by the Board’s result-oriented decisions.
It is hard to believe that this practice would have developed, or would
continue, if the Board applied traditional APA standards in appeals.
Conversely, application of APA standards would require—and should
require—changes to certain Board practices and policies,
First, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should instruct his
Board to abandon its “policy” that CMS has no real burden to demonstrate
noncompliance but may impose sanctions based only on a “presumption”
that every allegation and conclusion by every surveyor set forth in a
Statement of Deficiencies—that is, the charging document—is correct. The
Board says that this “presumption” is an artifact of its “policy” that a
petitioner challenging a CMS action has the burden throughout the
proceeding to demonstrate compliance. But the APA specifically provides
that CMS, as proponent of an order imposing a sanction, has the burden to
demonstrate the evidentiary and legal basis for its order before the petitioner
has any obligation to offer any evidence or argument.149 That rule puts the
burden of demonstrating noncompliance, and extracting penalties, squarely
on the party, CMS, that is charged by law with an enforcement role.150
Second, the Secretary should instruct his Board to abandon its “de novo”
review policy, at least as currently employed to mean that ALJs and the Board
have some sort of implied general warrant to oversee and intervene in the
care of specific residents rather than reviewing the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the agency that is tasked with that process.151 As a
Relationship Between Quality of Care and Negligence in Nursing Homes, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1243 (2011).
149. As noted above, the Board actually held in Hillman that CMS, as proponent of an
order imposing a sanction, does have the burden to demonstrate a “prima facie case” of
noncompliance before the burden of proceeding shifts to the petitioner to offer a defense or
demonstrate compliance. Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1611 (Feb. 28, 1997),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/1997/dab1611.html, aff’d, No. 98-3789 (D.N.J. 1999). However, the Board
abandoned the Hillman rule about ten years ago.
150. One Court of Appeals has noted that the enforcement process is “quasi-criminal” in
nature. Grace Healthcare of Benton v. DHHS, 589 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2009).
151. See, e.g., Avon Nursing Home, DAB Dec. No. 2830 (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2830.pdf.
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practical matter, ALJs and Board members have no special medical or health
care operations training; indeed, their experience in the area is limited to
what they learn in the course of specific appeals, yet they increasingly base
decisions upon their views of how nursing facilities “ought to” operate
(sometimes irrespective of actual CMS policy) and, as noted, sometimes even
second-guess specific medical judgments and decisions by physicians and
nurses.
As a matter of administrative law, the Board has no statutory or regulatory
authority to impose sanctions “de novo” nor to initiate or restate a charge of
noncompliance. But the Board says that it is not bound by the Supreme
Court’s seminal case that holds that a reviewing tribunal may not substitute
a “post hoc rationalization” for the basis set forth by the agency for its own
decision.152 According to the Board, that rule binds only the courts and not
its administrative review. Thus, as discussed above, the Board has expressly
abandoned any role as an independent reviewer of CMS’ factual assertions
and legal interpretations, and now sees itself as the final step in the
enforcement process, where it can fix agency errors.153 That is plainly not the
function of the independent administrative—that is, pre-judicial—review
that Congress contemplated in either the Social Security Act or APA—and
that the Supreme Court has held is an element of due process in the
administrative review context.154 Vitiation of appeal rights in this manner
would seem to pose both APA and due process issues.
The obvious practical question would seem to be, if the Board and its ALJs
do not see themselves as providing independent review of agency actions,
then who is to provide such review?
As noted, the courts are beginning to scrutinize ad hoc surveyor findings
as well as the result-oriented shortcuts the Board employs during the appeal
process.155 The fact that the Board does not apply APA standards to its
152. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
153. Golden Living Ctr.—Riverchase v. CMS, DAB No. 2314 (Apr. 12, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2314.pdf; Beatrice State Dev. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2311 (Mar.31, 2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2010/dab2311.pdf; Britthaven of Chapel Hill v. CMS., DAB No. 2284 (Nov. 17,
2009),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2009/dab2284.pdf; Cal Turner Extended Care Pavilion v. CMS, DAB No. 2030 (May
25,
2006),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/boarddecisions/2006/dab2030.htm.
154. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
155. This is a recent development. Before 2010 or so—that is, when the Board and its ALJs
did exercise independent review of CMS actions—courts of appeals affirmed nearly every
Board decision. Representative reported decisions include Windsor Place v. U.S. Dep’t of
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reviews can be—and sometimes is—asserted as a flaw in all of the
administrative steps that precede Board action. As a result, more cases are
being appealed to the courts of appeals that raise the fundamental APA issues
discussed above.
However, while the courts have set aside some individual Board decisions,
they have had difficulty designing and implementing effective remedies for
systemic breakdowns of the agency’s appeals processes. For instance, DHHS’
parallel reimbursement disallowance appeal process has essentially ground
to a halt under the weight of literally hundreds of thousands of pending
appeals. A coalition of providers sought judicial intervention to break the
logjam, and a district court ordered the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to create a process to decide all of the pending appeals, but on a
schedule that the Secretary argued was impossible to achieve. A split court of
appeals panel reversed the district court order, ruling that the district court
had not adequately addressed the Secretary’s “impossibility” argument.
However, the court did not disagree with the gist of the plaintiffs’ argument
that providers had a reasonable expectation that the agency would hear and
decide their appeals within a reasonable time—all agreed that the providers
would win or settle at least some of the stalled appeals—and so the agency’s
refusal even to address systemic delays that had the effect of tying up their
money indefinitely was intolerable.156
As of the publication date of this paper, that specific case remains
unresolved, but it is notable that a panel of the Fifth Circuit sustained another
approach to resolving the same administrative breakdown. In that case, the
district court held that the harm caused by delays in processing
reimbursement appeals outweighed the government’s interest in exhaustion
of the administrative process, and so the court directed the Secretary not to
recoup a facility’s disputed reimbursement pending the administrative
litigation.157 The court distinguished the series of Supreme Court cases
requiring exhaustion; according to the court, the interim remedy it devised
balanced the petitioner’s interest in avoiding harm caused solely by the

Health & Human Servs., 649 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2011); Fal-Meridian, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 604 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2010); Livingston Care Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 388 F.3d 168 (6th Cir. 2004); Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson,
373 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2004); MeadowWood Nursing Home v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 364 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2004); Woodstock Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 583
(6th Cir. 2003); and Fairfax Nursing Home v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 300 F.3d
835 (7th Cir. 2002).
156. Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
157. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, 886 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2018).
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agency’s delays and the agency’s interest in preserving its enforcement
prerogatives.
These courts’ focus on both the direct and indirect impacts of systemic
administrative breakdowns is not a novel issue. As long ago as 1982, for
instance, a court of appeals panel would have allowed Medicare beneficiaries
appealing denial of coverage for a controversial medical procedure to avoid
exhausting the appeal process where more than 400 consecutive claimants
had won such appeals, with the Court holding that the delays and
unnecessary litigation themselves triggered APA and due process rights (the
Supreme Court did reverse on the exhaustion issue).158 It is common in some
judicial districts for judges or magistrates to award interim relief to Social
Security claimants caught in the appeal morass. Thus, it seems likely that at
some point, one or more judges will be offended by the Board’s delays,
prehearing “escrows,” and, ultimately, its “facilities never win” policy, and
they will intervene in a way that could erect significant roadblocks for the
agency. There is no legal reason why a court offended by shortcuts in the
Board’s appeal process could not order the Secretary to fix such flaws, or
could even allow petitioners to avoid the process in some circumstances.159
There really is no public policy that favors ad hoc and potentially heavyhanded judicial intervention into legitimate enforcement prerogatives. Thus,
the respectful suggestion is that the sooner the Secretary and the Board
recognize that they have good reason and means to improve the Part 498
appeal process—specifically, by rigorously applying APA standards in
independent reviews of agency actions—the more likely they can insulate the
results of that process against judicial second-guessing.
Moreover, perhaps ironically, many counsel to nursing facilities believe as
a practical matter that the Board’s outcome-oriented policies actually have
the effect of increasing the number (and intensity) of appeals, as facility
operators grow frustrated with seemingly arbitrary citations and penalties yet
must exhaust the administrative appeal process before pursuing a judicial
158. Ringer v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Heckler v.
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 627 (1984).
159. In 2018, a group of related nursing facilities filed a motion to the Board to require an
ALJ to decide a series of appeals—including a termination case—that had been tried more
than two years earlier. The Board denied the motions on the ground that even though 42 C.F.R.
§ 498.74 requires ALJs to decide cases “[a]s soon as [is] practical,” its regulations did not allow
a petitioner to raise the issue before the Board. Ruling in Signature Healthcare of E. Louisville
v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-14-1127, Signature Healthcare of
Pikeville v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-14-1916, and Donelson Place
Care & Rehab. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-15-2222. The Board’s
ruling was arguably appealable to the District Court, but the ALJ quickly issued a notice that
notwithstanding the Board’s ruling, he would—and did—decide the cases promptly thereafter.
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challenge where they might prevail. As noted above, in a perfect world, CMS
would win every appeal on the merits because it had announced clear
guidance, the surveyor had carefully documented the alleged noncompliance,
CMS meticulously tied evidence to controlling regulatory and clinical
standards, and ALJs found facts and applied the law as the APA
contemplates. That would be in the agency’s best interest, but, more
importantly, such a result would help ensure the best interests of the residents
whom the agency is bound to serve.

